Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete  by Rusinowitch, Michaël & Turuani, Mathieu
Theoretical Computer Science 299 (2003) 451–475
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Protocol insecurity with a #nite number of
sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Micha+el Rusinowitch∗ , Mathieu Turuani
LORIA-INRIA, Universite Henri Poincare, 54506 Vandoeuvre-les-Nancy Cedex, France
Received 19 October 2001; received in revised form 15 March 2002; accepted 6 May 2002
Communicated by M. Wirsing
Abstract
We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a #nite number of sessions
(#xed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to
a Dolev–Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages
and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an
attack with a #xed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size,
provided that they are represented as dags.
c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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0. Introduction
Even assuming perfect cryptography, the design of protocols for secure electronic
transactions is highly error-prone and conventional validation techniques based on in-
formal arguments and=or testing are not su<cient for meeting the required security
level.
On the other hand, veri#cation tools based on formal methods have been quite
successful in discovering new =aws in well-known security protocols. These methods
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include state exploration using model-checking as in [2,8,19,27], logic programming
[21], term rewriting [10,18], tree automata [9,16] or a combination of these techniques.
Other approaches aim at proving the correctness of a protocol. They are based on
authentication logics or proving security properties by induction using interactive proof-
assistants (see [3,24]).
Although the general veri#cation problem is undecidable [15] even in the restricted
case where the size of messages is bounded [14], it is interesting to investigate decid-
able fragments of the underlying logics and their complexity. The success of practical
veri#cation tools indicates that there may exist interesting decidable fragments that
capture many concrete security problems. Dolev and Yao have proved that for simple
ping-pong protocols, insecurity can be decided in polynomial time [12]. On the other
hand [14] shows that when messages are bounded and when no nonces (i.e. new data)
are created by the protocol and the intruder, then the existence of a secrecy =aw is
decidable and DEXPTIME-complete. The complexity for the case of #nite sessions
was mentioned as open in [14].
A related decidability result is presented in [1,17]. The authors give a procedure for
checking whether an unsafe state is reachable by the protocol. Their result holds for
the case of #nite sessions but with no bounds on the intruder messages. The detailed
proof in [1] does not allow general messages (not just names) as encryption keys.
The authors do not analyze the complexity of their procedure. 1 After the presentation
of the #rst version of our paper in CSFW’01 [26], another decision procedure for
composed keys has been announced in [23]. However, this last paper does not give
any complexity analysis of the problem.
Our result states that for a #xed number of interleaved protocol runs but with no
bounds on the intruder messages the existence of an attack is NP-complete. We allow
public key encryption as well as the possibility of symmetric encryption with composed
keys, i.e. with any message. In this paper we only consider secrecy properties. However,
authentication can be handled in a similar way. Hence, a protocol is considered insecure
if it is possible to reach a state where the intruder possesses a secret term. Thanks to
the proof technique, we have been able to extend the result directly to various intruder
models and to protocols with choice points.
Our main complexity result is rather a theoretical one. However, it gives informa-
tion of practical relevance since for its proof we have shown that in order to attack
a protocol an intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size with respect to the
size of the protocol. This gives a low bound for the message space to be explored
when looking for a =aw, e.g. with a model-checker and this explains also why many
tools are eLective in protocol analysis: to put it informally, in the Dolev–Yao model
=awed protocols can be attacked with small faked messages. A deterministic version of
our algorithm has been implemented. 2 The prototype does not generate all messages
of maximal size but rather composes them in a goal-oriented way [5,6]. It performs very
1 They have announced recently an NP procedure for atomic keys.
2 See www.loria.fr/equipes/protheo/SOFTWARES/CASRUL/
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well on standard benchmarks since it has analyzed and found =aws in 30 protocols
reported as insecure (out of the 50 protocols of [7]) in [13].
Layout of the paper: We #rst introduce in Section 1 our model of protocols and
intruder and give the notion of attack and normal attack in Section 2. Then in
Section 3 we study properties of derivations with intruder rules. This allows us to
derive polynomial bounds for normal attacks and then to show that the problem of
#nding a normal attack is in NP. We show in Section 4 that the existence of an attack
is NP-hard. In Section 5 we show that the NP procedure of Section 6 can be extended
to a stronger intruder model (Section 5.1), weaker intruder model (Section 5.2) and
also protocols with choice points (Section 5.3).
1. Protocol model
We consider a model of protocols in the style of [4]. The actions of any honest
principal are speci#ed as a partially ordered list that associates to (the format of) a
received message its corresponding reply. The activity of the intruder is modeled by
rewrite rules on sets of messages. We suppose that the initialization phase of distribut-
ing keys and other information between principals is implicit. The approach is quite
natural and it is simple to compile a wide range of protocol descriptions into our
formalism. For instance existing tools such as CAPSL [10] or CASRUL [18] would
perform this translation with few modi#cations. We present our model more formally
now.
1.1. Names and messages
The messages exchanged during the protocol execution are built using pairing 〈 ; 〉
and encryption operators { }s , { }p. We add a superscript to distinguish between public
key (p) and symmetric key (s) encryptions. The set of basic messages is #nite and
denoted by Atoms. It contains names for principals and atomic keys from the set
Keys. Since we have a #nite number of sessions we also assume any nonce is a basic
message: we consider that it has been created before the session and belongs to the
initial knowledge of the principal that generates it.
Any message can be used as a key for symmetric encryption. Only elements from
Keys are used for public key encryption. Given a public key (resp. private key) k,
k−1 denotes the associated private key (resp. public key) and it is an element of Keys.
Given a symmetric key k then, k−1 will denote the same key.
The messages are then generated by the following (tree) grammar:
msg ::= Atoms | 〈msg; msg〉|{msg}pKeys | {msg}smsg:
For conciseness we denote by m1; m2; : : : ; mn the set of messages {m1; m2; : : : ; mn}.
Given two sets of messages M and M ′ we denote by M;M ′ the union of their
elements and given a set of messages M and a message t, we denote by M; t the
set M ∪{t}.
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1.2. Protocol speci:cation
We shall describe protocols by a list of actions for each principal. In order to describe
the protocol steps we introduce message terms (or terms for short). We assume that we
have a #nite set of variables Var. Then the set of terms is generated by the following
tree grammar:
term ::= Var |Atoms | 〈term; term〉 | {term}pkeys | {term}sterm
Let Var(t) be the set of variables that occur in a term t. A substitution assigns terms
to variables. A ground substitution assigns messages to variables. The application of
a substitution  to a term t is written t. We also write [x← u] the substitution 
de#ned by (x)= u and (y)=y for y = x. The set of subterms of t is denoted by
Sub(t). These notations are extended to sets of terms E in a standard way. For instance,
E= {t | t ∈E}.
A principal (except the initiator) reply after receiving a message matching a speci#ed
term associated to its current state. Then from the previously received messages (and
initial knowledge) he builds the next message he will send. This concrete message is
obtained by instantiating the variables in the message pattern associated to the current
step in the protocol speci#cation.
A protocol is given with a #nite set of principal names Names⊆Atoms, and a
partially ordered list of steps for each principal name. This partial order is to ensure
that the actions of each principal are performed in the right order. More formally we
associate to each principal A a partially ordered #nite set (WA;¡WA). Each protocol
step is speci#ed by a pair of terms denoted R⇒ S and is intended to represent some
message R expected by a principal A and his reply S to this message. Hence a protocol
speci#cation P is given by
{(; R ⇒ S) |  ∈ I};
where I= {(A; i) |A∈Names and i∈WA}. We write |I| for the size of I. Init and
End are #xed messages used to initiate and close a protocol session. An environment
for a protocol is a set of messages. A correct execution order " is a one-to-one mapping
" : I→{1; : : : ; |I|} such that for all A∈Names and i¡WA j we have "(A; i)¡"(A; j).
In other words " de#nes an execution order for the protocol steps. This order is
compatible with the partial order of each principal. A protocol execution is given by
a ground substitution , a correct execution order " and a sequence of environments
E0; : : : ; E|I| verifying: Init ∈E0, End∈E|I|, and for all 16k6|I|, R"−1(k)∈Ek−1 and
S"−1(k)∈Ek .
Each step  of the protocol extends the current environment by adding the corre-
sponding message S when R is present. One can remark that principals are not
allowed to generate any new data such as nonces. But this is not a problem when the
number of sessions is #nite: in this setting from the operational point it is equivalent
to assume that the new data generated by a principal during a protocol execution is
part of his initial knowledge.
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Table 1
Intruder rules (see Section 5 for an extension)
Decomposition rules Composition rules
Ld(〈a; b〉): 〈a; b〉→ a; b; 〈a; b〉 Lc(〈a; b〉): a; b→ a; b; 〈a; b〉
Ld({a}pK ): {a}pK ; K−1→{a}pK ; K−1; a Lc({a}pK ): a; K→ a; K; {a}pK ,
Ld({a}sb): {a}sb; b→{a}sb; b; a Lc({a}sb): a; b→ a; b; {a}sb
Example: Needham Schroeder protocol
Let us give a variant of the Needham Schroeder protocol in our setting. We assume
that every nonce is included in the initial knowledge of the principal that will create
it and that a principal A who wishes to communicate with B will send his public key
(instead of his name in the standard version):
((A,1), Init ⇒ {〈NA; KA〉}KB) ((B,1), {〈x2; x3〉}KB ⇒ {〈x2; NB〉}x3 ),
((A,2), {〈NA; y1〉}KA ⇒ {y1}KB) ((B,2), {NB}KB ⇒ End).
The orderings on steps are the ones that are expected: WA=WB= {1; 2} with 1¡WA2,
1¡WB2. We do not consider that the protocol speci#cation is a set of rules such that
the scope of the variables occurring in a rule is restricted to this rule. On the contrary,
the variables are global in our case and their scope may include several lines of the
speci#cation. Hence our modeling approach is diLerent from the one in [14]. See for
example the Otway–Rees protocol given in Section 2.
1.3. Intruder
In the Dolev–Yao model [12] the intruder has the ability to eavesdrop, to divert and
memorize messages, to compose and decompose, to encrypt and decrypt when he has
the key, to generate new messages and send them to other participants with a false
identity. We assume here without loss of generality that the intruder systematically
diverts messages, possibly modi#es them and forwards them to the receiver under the
identity of the o<cial sender. In other words all communications are mediated by a
hostile environment represented by the intruder. The intruder actions for modifying the
messages are simulated by rewrite rules on sets of messages. The rewrite relation is
de#ned by M→M ′ if there exists one of the rule l→ r in Table 1 such that l is
a subset of M and M ′ is obtained by replacing l by r in M . We write →∗ for the
re=exive and transitive closure of →.
The set of messages S0 represents the initial knowledge of the intruder. We assume
that at least the name of the intruder Charlie belongs to this set.
Intruder rules are divided in several groups: rules for composing or decomposing
messages. These rewrite rules are the only one we consider in this paper and any
mentions of “rules” refer to these rules. In the following a, b and c represent any mes-
sage and K represents any element of Key. For instance, the rule with label Lc(〈a; b〉)
replaces a set of messages a; b by the following set of messages a; b; 〈a; b〉.
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See Table 1 for the complete intruder rules, and Section 5 for an extension. We
denote the application of a rule R to a set E of messages with result E′ by E→R E′.
We write Lc = {Lc(a) | for all messages a}, and Ld in the same way, and a is called
the principal term of a rule Lc(a) or Ld(a). We call derivation a sequence of rule ap-
plications E0→R1 E1→R2 · · · →Rn En. The rules Ri for i=1; : : : ; n are called the rules
of this derivation D. We write R∈D (abusively) to denote that R is one of the rules
Ri, for i=1; : : : ; n, that have been used in the derivation D.
One can remark that if the intruder was allowed to generate new data he will not
get more power. He is already able to create in#nitely many data only known to him
with simple encryptions. For instance he can construct {N}N ; {{N}N}N ; : : : assuming
that N is only known by the intruder.
2. Attacks
Considering a protocol speci#cation and a special term Secret (called secret term),
we say that there is an attack in N protocol sessions if the intruder can obtain the
secret term in its knowledge set after completing at most N sessions. We consider #rst
the case of a single session. Then we shall sketch in Section 3.4 how to reduce the
case of several sessions to the unique session case.
Since received messages are matched by principals with the left-hand sides of pro-
tocol steps, meaning that some substitution unify the messages sent by the intruder
and waited by the principals, the existence of an attack can be expressed as a con-
straint solving problem: is there a way for the intruder to build from its initial knowl-
edge and already sent messages a new message (de#ned by a substitution for the
variables of protocol steps) that will be accepted by the recipient, and so on, until
the end of the session, and such that at the end the secret term is known by the
intruder.
We introduce now a predicate forge for checking whether a message can be con-
structed by the intruder from some known messages. This predicate can be viewed as
the combination of predicates synth and analz from Paulson [24].
Denition 1 ( forge). Let E be a set of terms and let t be a term such that there is E′
with E→∗ E′ and t ∈E′. Then we say that t is forged from E and we denote it by
t ∈ forge(E).
Let k be the cardinality of I, i.e. the total number of steps of the protocol. An attack
is a protocol execution where the intruder can modify each intermediate environment
and where the message Secret belongs to the #nal environment. In an attack the intruder
is able to forge any message expected by a principal by using its initial knowledge
and already sent messages (spied in the environments). This means, formally, that a
given protocol execution, with sequence of environments E0; : : : ; Ek , is an attack if
for all 16i6k we have Ei−1; S"−1(i)→∗i and Ek; S"−1(k)→∗ Ek+1 with Secret ∈Ek+1.
However by de#nition t ∈ forge(E) iL there is E′ such that E→∗ t; E′. Hence, we can
reformulate the de#nition of an attack using the predicate Forge:
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Denition 2 (attack). Given a protocol P= {R′⇒ S ′ | ∈I}, a secret message Secret
and assuming the intruder has initial knowledge S0, an attack is described by a
ground substitution  and a correct execution order " :I→ 1; : : : ; k such that for
all i=1; : : : ; k, we have Ri∈ forge(S0; S1; : : : ; Si−1) and Secret∈ forge(S0; S1; : : : ;
Sk) where Ri =R′"−1(i) and Si = S
′
"−1(i).
Before proceeding let us give as a detailed example an attack with Otway–Rees
protocol.
Example: Otway–Rees protocol
The participants of the protocols are A; B and the server S. The symmetric keys
Kas; Kbs will be, respectively, shared by the participants (A; S), (B; S). The identi#ers
M;Na; Nb represents nonces. In Step 3, the server S creates the new secret symmetric
key Kab to be used by A and B for further safe communications. We have added an
extra step 5 in order to show how Kab is applied by A to send a secret message to B.
In the attack, A will be fooled into believing that the term 〈M;A; B〉 is in fact the new
key. The sequence of messages de#ning Otway–Rees is:
1. A -> B : M,A,B,{Na,<M,A,B>}Kas
2. B -> S : M,A,B,{Na,<M,A,B>}Kas,
{Nb,<M,A,B>}Kbs
3. S -> B : M,{Na,Kab}Kas,{Nb,Kab}Kbs
4. B -> A : M,{Na,Kab}Kas
5. A -> B : {Secret}Kab
For simplicity we write M;M ′; M ′′ for 〈〈M;M ′〉; M ′′〉. Let us write now this protocol
speci#cation with our notation.
{
((A; 1), init ⇒ 〈M;A; B〉; {NA; 〈M;A; B〉}KAS ),
((B; 1), 〈x2; x3; B〉; x4 ⇒ x2; x3; B; x4; {NB; x2; x3; B}KBS ),
((S; 1), x7; xA; xB; {x8; x7; xA; xB}KAS ;⇒ x7; {x8; Kab}KAS ; {x9; Kab}KBS ),
{x9; x7; xA; xB}KBS
((B; 2), x2; x5; {NB; x6}KBS ⇒ x2; x5),
((A; 2), M; {NA; x1}KAS ⇒{Secret}x1 ),
((B; 3), {Secret}x6 ⇒ end),
}.
An execution can be obtained by taking the protocol steps in the given order and by
applying the following substitution:
x1 =Kab, x2 =M , x3 =A, x5 = {x8; Kab}KAS , x6 =Kab, xA=A,
x4 = {〈NA; 〈M;A; B〉〉}KAS , x7 =M , x8 =NA, x9 =NB, xB=B.
An attack can be performed on this protocol with initial intruder knowledge S0 =
{Charlie; init}, using:
Substitution Protocol steps
= [x1←〈M;A; B〉] "(1)= (A; 1), "(2)= (A; 2)
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since R"(1)∈Forge(S0), R"(2)∈Forge(S0; S"(1)) and Secret ∈Forge(S0; S"(1);
S"(2)).
We introduce now a measure on attacks and a notion of minimal attack among all
attacks, called a normal attack. We shall prove in the next sections that normal attacks
have polynomial bounds for a suitable representation of terms.
The size of a message term t is denoted |t| and de#ned as:
• |t|=1 for any t ∈Atoms, except for Charlie where |Charlie|=0,
• and recursively by |〈x; y〉|= |{x}y|= |x|+ |y|+ 1.
Note that Charlie is the minimal size message. We recall that a #nite multiset over
natural numbers is a function M from N to N with #nite domain. We shall use a
more intuitive set-like notation for them: {2; 2; 2; 5} will denote the function M such
that M (5)= 1; M (2)= 3 and M (x) has value 0 otherwise. We shall compare #nite
multisets of naturals by extending the ordering on N as follows: MN if (i) M =N
and (ii) whenever N (x)¿M (x) then M (y)¿N (y) for some y¿x. Equivalently  is
the smallest ordering on multisets of naturals such that:
M ∪ {s}N ∪ {t1; : : : ; tn} if M = N and s¿ti for all i ∈ 1; : : : ; n
For instance {3; 1; 1; 1}¿{2; 2; 2; 1}. We shall now de#ne a normal attack as an
attack such that the multiset of the sizes of all messages exchanged by the principals
and the intruder during the protocol session is minimal for the multiset ordering on N.
Denition 3 (normal attack). Given a protocol P= {R′⇒ S ′ | ∈I}, an attack (; ")
is normal if the multiset of non-negative integers {|R1|; : : : ; |Rk|} is minimal, with
Ri =R′"−1(i) and Si = S
′
"−1(i).
Clearly if there is an attack there is a normal attack since the measure is a well-
founded ordering on #nite multisets of non-negative integers. Note also that a normal
attack is not necessarily unique. We now present a NP procedure for detecting the
existence of a normal attack.
3. Existence of a normal attack is in NP
A key ingredient for proving membership in NP is the representation of messages
as directed acyclic graph (DAG). This is motivated by the fact that we can encode
easily the term uni#cation problem as an insecurity problem and that it is well known
that the uni#er of two terms may have exponential size when the terms are represented
as trees. For instance the following protocol is subject to an attack if and only if the
terms s and t are uni#able. We assume that x1; : : : ; xn are the variables occurring in s; t
and that K is a key known only to A and B.
((A; 1), 〈x1; : : : ; xn〉 ⇒{〈s; t〉}K),
((B; 1), {〈x; x〉}K ⇒ Secret).
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Hence with a tree representation for some protocols it would require exponential space
to write the substitution associated to an attack.
We #rst show some basic facts on the DAG-representation of message terms. Then
we shall show how to obtain from any derivation a more compact one. We will then be
able to prove that a normal attack has a polynomial size w.r.t. the size of the protocol
and intruder knowledge, when using DAG-representations.
3.1. Preliminaries
The DAG-representation of a set E of message terms is the graph (V;E) with
labeled edges, where:
• the set of vertices V= Sub(E), the set of subterms of E,
• the set of edges E: {vs left→ ve | ∃b; vs= {ve}b or vs= 〈ve; b〉}∪ {vs right→ ve | ∃b; vs=
{b}ve or vs= 〈b; ve〉}.
Remark 1. The DAG-representation is unique.
If n is the number of elements in Sub(t), one can remark that (V;E) has at most
n nodes and 2:n edges. Hence its size is linear in n, and for convenience we shall
de#ne the DAG-size of E, denoted by |E|DAG, to be the number of distinct subterms
of E, i.e. the number of elements in Sub(E). For a term t, we simply write |t|DAG for
|{t}|DAG.
Lemma 1. For all set of terms E, for all variables x and for all messages t, we have:
|E[x← t]|DAG6|E; t|DAG.
Proof. Given a set of terms E, a variable x and a message t, we want to show:
|E[x← t]|DAG6|E; t|DAG:
Let us #rst remark that we have |t; t|DAG = |t|DAG. We recall that Sub(E′) denotes
the set of subterms of E′. We introduce a function f : Sub(E[x← t])→ Sub(E; t) and
we show that f is one-to-one. Let us de#ne f for -∈ Sub(E[x← t]) by
• f(-)= - if -∈ Sub(t),
• f(-)= -′ if -= -′[x← t] for some subterm -′ of E.
When several -′ are possible in the de#nition above then we take one arbitrarily. Let
us show that f is one-to-one. Consider -; .∈ Sub(E[x← t]) with - = ..
• If -; .∈ Sub(t) then f(-)= -, f(.)= ., and f(-) =f(.).
• If -∈ Sub(t) and .= .′[x← t], and .′ ∈ Sub(E), then -[x← t] = - = .′[x← t], - = .′
and so f(-) =f(.).
• If -= -′[x← t] and .= .′[x← t], with -′; .′ ∈ Sub(E), then -′ = .′ and f(-) =f(.).
This proves the property, since the DAG-size of a set of terms is equal to number of
distinct subterms they contain.
Corollary 1. For all set of terms E, for all ground substitutions /, we have |E/|DAG6
|E; /(x1); : : : ; /(xk)|DAG where {x1; : : : ; xk} is the set of variables in Var. (recall that
Var is :nite).
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Proof. We simply apply Lemma 1 above for each xi.
Remark 2. We only need polynomial time to check that a rule l→ l; r′ can be
applied to E and to compute the resulting DAG-E′, when we have already a
DAG-representation of E, l and r′. This is due to the fact that we only need to #rst
check that all terms in l are also in E and then to compute the DAG-representation
E′ of E; r′.
We are now going to present a NP decision procedure for #nding an attack. The
procedure amounts to guess a correct execution order ", a possible ground substitution
 with a DAG-size polynomially bounded, and k + 1 lists of rules of length n2, and
#nally to check that when applying these lists of rules the intruder can build all expected
messages as well as the secret.
We assume that we are given a protocol speci#cation {(; R′⇒ S ′) | ∈I}. Let P=
{R′; S ′ | ∈I}, a secret message Secret and a #nite set of messages S0 for initial
intruder knowledge. If P; S0 is not given in DAG-representation, they are #rst converted
to this format (in polynomial time). We assume that the DAG-size of P; S0 is n, the
#nite set of variables in P is V , and |I|= k.
The NP procedure for checking the existence of an attack is written in Fig. 1. To
prove the correction of this procedure we shall show that we can put a bound on the
length of normal attacks. We will #rst give properties about derivations. We will also
give polynomial bounds on the substitution  that is used in a normal attack.
3.2. Derivations
In this section, we will give some useful de#nitions and properties of derivations.
We shall introduce a notion of normal derivation, denoted by Derivt(E). A related
notion of normal derivation has been studied in [8]. Rather than a natural deduction
presentation in [8] we use here term rewriting.
Denition 4. Given a derivation D=E0→R1 E1→R2 · · · →Rn En, a term t is a goal of
D if t ∈En and t =∈En−1.
For instance if t ∈ forge(E) there exists a derivation with goal t: we take a deri-
vation D=E→R1 · · · →Rn E′ with t ∈E′ and then we take the smallest pre#x of D
containing t.
This allows us to de#ne some normal derivation, i.e. derivation minimal in length:
Denition 5. We denote Derivt(E) a derivation of minimal length among the deriva-
tions from E with goal t (chosen arbitrarily among the possible ones).
In order to bound the length of such derivations, we can prove the two following
lemmas: every intermediate term in Derivt(E) is a subterm of E or t. Lemma 2 means
that if a term is decomposed in a minimal derivation from E then this term has not
been composed before and therefore belongs to E:
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1. Guess a correct execution order " : I→{1; : : : ; k}.
Let Ri =R′"−1(i) and Si = S
′
"−1(i) for i∈{1; : : : ; k}
2. Guess a ground substitution such that for all x∈V , (x) has DAG-size
6n.
3. For each i∈{1; : : : ; k + 1} guess an ordered list li of n rules whose
principal terms have DAG-size 6n.
4. For each i∈{1; : : : ; k} check that li applied to {Sj | j¡i}∪ {S0} gen-
erates Ri.
5. Check that lk+1 applied to {Sj | j¡k + 1}∪ {S0} generates Secret.
6. If each check is successful then answer YES.
Fig. 1. NP decision procedure for the insecurity problem.
Lemma 2. If there exists t′ such that Ld(t′)∈Derivt(E) then t′ is a subterm of E.
Proof. Let D=Derivt(E). By minimality of D, we have Lc(t′) =∈D. Then either t′ ∈E
and we have the conclusion of the lemma. Otherwise there exists a rule Ld(t1[t′])
in D generating t′. But any rule in D generating t1[t′] must be in Ld (if not, the
decomposition would be useless and the derivation would not be minimal): we can
iterate this reasoning on t1[t′], and this ends the proof: t′ increases strictly at each
iteration and the derivation only contains a #nite number of terms.
Lemma 3 means that in a minimal derivation we only need to compose subterms of
the #nal goal or keys occurring in the initial set E.
Lemma 3. If there exists t′ such that Lc(t′)∈Derivt(E) then t′ is a subterm of {t}∪E.
Proof. Let D=Derivt(E). By minimality of D, we have Ld(t′) =∈D. Hence either
t′ ∈{t} ∪ E and the lemma is proved. Otherwise there is at last one rule using t′:
if not, Lc(t′) would be useless and Derivt(E) not minimal. Then we have two cases to
consider. In the #rst case, there exists a such that Ld({a}t′−1 )∈D, hence {a}t′−1 is a
subterm of E by the Lemma 2, and so is t′. In the second case, there exists b such that
Lc({t′}b)∈D or Lc({b}t′)∈D. In this case, we can iterate this reasoning on t1 = {t′}b
or t1 = {b}t′ . This ends the proof, because t′ strictly increases at each iteration and the
derivation only contain a #nite number of terms.
We show in the next proposition that there always exists derivations of a term t
from a set E with a number of rules bounded by the DAG-size of initial and #nal
terms t; E. This will be very useful to bound the length of the derivations involved in
the research of an attack.
Proposition 1. For any set of terms E and for any term t, if Derivt(E)=E→L1
E1 · · ·→Ln En then n6|t; E|DAG and for all 16i6n, |Ei|DAG6|t; E|DAG.
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Proof. Let us prove that the number of steps in Derivt(E) is at most |t; E|DAG by
examining the terms composed or decomposed for any rule R that has been applied
in Derivt(E). From Lemma 2 every term decomposed (with Ld) is derived from E by
decompositions exclusively. Hence every term which is decomposed was a subterm of
E and is counted in |E|DAG. From Lemma 3 every term composed (by Lc) is used
as a subterm of a key or of t. Hence it is counted in |t; E|DAG. Every rule R either
composes or decomposes a term, but R never composes (resp. decomposes) a term
which has already been composed (resp. decomposed). Hence to each subterm of E or
t corresponds at most one rule application in Derivt(E) for composing or decomposing
it. (merging identical subterms)
Hence the number of terms composed or decomposed in Derivt(E) is bounded
by the number of distinct subterms of E; t and the #rst part of the result follows.
Since each intermediate term is a subterm of E; t, the second part of the proposition
follows.
Another category of useful derivations is introduced in the following Proposition 2.
Informally, the proposition states that if a term / can be forged from a set of message
E by composing two messages /1; /2 both derived from E then it is always possible
to avoid decomposing / in a derivation from E (with any goal t) since such a decom-
position would generate messages /1; /2 that can be derived directly from E in another
way.
This proposition will allow us to prove the Lemma 4.
Proposition 2. Let t ∈ forge(E) and /∈ forge(E) be given with Deriv/(E) ending with
an application of a rule in Lc. Then there is a derivation D with goal t starting from
E, and verifying Ld(/) =∈D.
Proof. Let t ∈ forge(E) and /∈ forge(E) be given with Deriv/(E) ending with an ap-
plication of a rule in Lc. Let D be Deriv/(E) without its last rule, i.e. Deriv/(E) is D
followed by Lc. Let D′ be the derivation obtained from Derivt(E) by replacing every
decomposition Ld of / by D.
Then D′ is a correct derivation, since D generates - and . which are the two direct
subterms of / (/ is obtained by a composition). D does not contain a decomposition Ld
of / from the fact that Deriv/(E) has / as goal, otherwise the last composition would
be useless.
Hence D′ satis#es Ld(/) =∈D and the lemma follows.
3.3. Polynomial bounds on normal attacks
We shall prove that when there exists an attack then a normal attack can always
be constructed from subterms that are already occurring in the problem speci#cation.
This will allow to give bounds on the messages sizes and on the number of rewritings
involved in such an attack.
Hence let us assume a protocol P= {R′⇒ S ′ | ∈I}, a secret message Secret
and a set of messages S0 as the initial intruder knowledge. We assume that there
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exists an attack described by a ground substitution  and a correct execution order
" :I→ 1; : : : ; k (where k is the cardinality of I). We de#ne Ri =R′"−1 and Si = S ′"−1
for i=1; : : : ; k.
We also de#ne: SP as the set of subterms of the terms in the set P= {Rj | j=1; : : : ;
k}∪ {Sj | j=0; : : : ; k}, and SP6i the set of subterms of the terms in {Rj | j=1; : : : ; i}
∪ {Sj | j=0; : : : ; i}.
We assume without loss of generality that Charlie∈ S0, i.e. the intruder initially
knows its name!
Denition 6. Let t and t′ be two terms and 0 a ground substitution. Then t is a 0-match
of t′ if t is not a variable and t0= t′. This will be denoted by t0 t′.
The following lemma is a key property of this paper. It allows us to prove that every
substitution  in a normal attack is only built with parts of the protocol speci#cation.
In this way, we will be able to prove that all substitution  in a normal attack has a
DAG-size bounded by a polynomial in the protocol DAG-size.
Lemma 4. Given a normal attack  for all variable x, there exists t  (x) such
that t ∈SP.
Proof. Let  be a normal attack, and let us #rst assume that there exists x such that
for all t such that t  (x) we have t =∈SP, and let us derive a contradiction. Let
us de#ne Nx = min{j | (x)∈SP6j}.
Nx is the #rst step of the protocol whose message contains (x) as a subterm, and
Nx =0 since (x) is not a subterm of S0. However, since for all t such that t  (x),
t is not in SP, there exists a variable y which is subterm of RNx or SNx such that
(x) is a subterm of (y). (Otherwise there would exist a -match of (x) with some
subterm of RNx). Then let us show now the following claim:
Claim. (x)∈ forge(S0; : : : ; SNx−1).
Proof. Let DerivRNx (S0; : : : ; SNx−1) be E0→L1 E1 · · · →Ln En. Since (x) is a subterm
of RNx and since RNx∈ forge(S0; : : : ; SNx−1), we have two cases. Either there exists
i6n such that (x)∈Ei and then obviously (x)∈ forge(S0; : : : ; SNx−1). Otherwise,
we will prove by induction that (x) occurs as a subterm in every intermediate set Ei.
We have (x) subterm of En since RNx∈En, and
If (x) subterm of s∈Ei and if there exists j6i such that Lj =Lc(s), then s = (x)
since (x) =∈Ej. Hence, (x) is a subterm of Ej−1.
If (x) subterm of s∈Ei and if there exists j6i such that s created by Lj =Ld(r),
then s and (x) are subterms of Ej−1.
If such a rule Lj does not exist, then (x) is a subterm of E0 and the iteration is
#nished.
This iteration implies that (x) is a subterm of E0 = S0; : : : ; SNx−1. But it is
impossible due to the choice of Nx.
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Hence there exists a derivation Deriv(x)(S0; : : : ; SNx−1) and we can notice that its
last step uses necessarily a composition rule since otherwise Lemma 2 would imply
that (x) is a subterm of S0; : : : ; SNx−1, and therefore a contradiction.
Let us de#ne the substitution ′ to be equal to  on all variables except for x where
′(x)=Charlie. We will prove that ′ de#nes an attack with the same execution order
than . Since  is an attack, for all j, Rj∈ forge(S0; : : : ; Sj−1).
If j¡Nx then since (x) has no occurrence in Rj; S0; : : : ; Sj−1, we have Rj=Rj
′, S0= S0′, . . . , Sj−1= Sj−1′. Therefore we also have Rj′ ∈ forge(S0′; : : : ;
Sj−1′)
If j¿Nx then there exists a derivation starting from E0 = S0; : : : ; Sj−1 with goal
Rj, denoted E0→L1 E1→L2 · · · →Lnj Enj . By Proposition 2, (x) is never decomposed
in this derivation: ∀i6nj, Li =Ld((x)). Let us build from this derivation a new one
where each (x) is replaced by Charlie. We shall denote by t1 the term obtained from
t by replacing every occurrence of (x) by Charlie. For convenience we shall consider
that E→E is a derivation step justi#ed by the identity rule ∅. Then we shall prove
that there exists a valid derivation:
E01→L′1 E11→L′2 · · · →L′nj Enj1;
where every rule L′i is either Li or ∅. Hence we only have to take the same rules as
in the initial derivation but possibly skip some steps. More precisely let us show that
for i=1 : : : nj, if Ei−1→Li Ei then either Ei−11→Li Ei1 or Ei−11→∅ Ei1.
1. If Li =Lc(〈-; .〉), then either (x) = 〈-; .〉 and (E′i−1; -; .)1→Li (E′i ; -; .; 〈-; .〉)1 is
a valid step since 〈-1; .1〉= 〈-; .〉1, or (x)= 〈-; .〉 and we can take L′i = ∅ since
Charlie∈Ei, for all i. The same reasoning stand for Li =Lc({-}.).
2. If Li =Ld(〈-; .〉) then (x) = 〈-; .〉, and (E′i−1; 〈-; .〉)1→Li (E′i ; 〈-; .〉; -; .)1 is valid
since 〈-1; .1〉= 〈-; .〉1. The same reasoning stand for Li =Ld({-}.).
Finally, we get for all j, Rj′ ∈ forge(S0′; : : : ; Sj−1′). Hence it follows that ′ is
an attack for the same protocol order than . Since ′ is obtained from  by simply
replacing the value of x by a strictly smaller one (w.r.t. | |) we have 〈|R1′|; : : : ; |Rk′|〉
strictly smaller than 〈|R1|; : : : ; |Rk|〉 and this is contradictory with the assumption of
normal attack for .
We can now use this lemma to bound the DAG-size of every (x). This is shown
in the following Theorem:
Theorem 1. If  is the substitution in a normal attack then we have for all x∈Var
|(x)|DAG6|P|DAG.
Proof. Given a set of variable U , we shall write TU = {(x) | x∈U}. Let us build by
induction a sequence of sets Ep⊆SP and a sequence of sets Vp of variables such
that |(x)|DAG6|Ep; Vp|DAG:
• Let (E0; V0) be (∅; {x}). We have |(x)|DAG6|E0; V0|DAG and E0⊆SP.
• Assume that we have built (Ep; Vp) such that |(x)|DAG6|Ep; Vp|DAG and Ep⊆SP,
let us de#ne Ep+1 and Vp+1: If Vp = ∅ let us choose x′ ∈Vp. Then there exists t 
(x′) such that t ∈SP. We de#ne Ep+1 =Ep ∪{t} and Vp+1 =Var(t)∪Vp − {x′}.
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Since t ∈SP, we have Ep+1⊆SP. Let us show that |(x)|DAG6|Ep+1; Vp+1|DAG.
Let 1= {[y← (y)]=y∈Var(t)}. By applying the Corollary 1 on Ep ∪{t}∪Vp − x′
for the substitution 1. (Remark: t1= (x′)) We obtain:
|Ep1; Vp|DAG6 |Ep; Vp − x′; t; Var(t)|DAG and then |Ep; Vp|DAG 6 |Ep1; Vp|DAG
6 |Ep+1; Vp+1|DAG:
Finally, this construction terminates since
∑
y∈Vp |(y)| strictly decreases. At the end
we get Vp= ∅ and |(x)|DAG6|Ep|DAG with Ep⊆SP: since |Ep|DAG6|P|DAG this
proves the theorem.
The consequence of Theorem 1 is that the DAG-size of the messages that are sent
or received during a normal attack is bounded by a polynomial in the DAG-size of
the protocol. This result has crucial practical implications since it means that when
searching for an attack we can give a simple a priori bound on the DAG-size of the
messages needed to be forged by the intruder:
Corollary 2. If  is the substitution in a normal attack then for all i=1; : : : ; k,
|Ri; S0; : : : ; Si−1|DAG6|P|DAG and |Secret; S0; : : : ; Sk|DAG6|P|DAG.
Proof. We can generalize proof of Theorem 1: starting from E0 = {Ri; S0; : : : ; Si−1} and
V0 =Var, we can obtain |E0; V0|DAG6|P|DAG. But we have |Ri; S0; : : : ; Si−1|DAG6
|E0; V0|DAG from Corollary 1, so the result is proved for Ri. And a similar proof can
be derived for the inequality |Secret; S0; : : : ; Sk|DAG6|P|DAG.
3.4. Protocol insecurity with :nite number of sessions is in NP
3.4.1. Single session case
We recall here the NP procedure for checking the existence of an attack and show
its correctness. We assume given a protocol speci#cation {(; R′⇒ S ′) | ∈I}. Let
P= {R′; S ′ | ∈I}, a secret message Secret and a #nite set of messages S0 for initial
intruder knowledge. If (P; S0) is not given in DAG-representation, they are #rst con-
verted to this format (in polynomial time). We assume that the DAG-size of P; S0 is n,
the #nite set of variables in P is V , and |I|= k. Let us #rst remark that the procedure
written in Section 3.1 is NP. A correct execution order is a permutation of I, and
can be guessed in polynomial time. Since (x) has DAG-size 6n, one can choose a
DAG-representation of (x) in time O(n) and  in O(n2). Since each rule in li has
DAG-size 6n and since li has at most n rules, one can choose each li in time O(n2),
and all li in time O(n3).
Remark. Each term in the rules is in DAG-representation. Computing the result E′ of
the application of a rule Lx(t) on E, with E and t in DAG-representation, can be done
in polynomial time in the DAG-size of E by Remark 2. So, checking that all li are
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correctly applied takes polynomial time of n. To verify that Ri is in the last set of
terms takes obviously polynomial time too.
We can now see that this procedure is correct since it answers YES if and only if
the protocol has an attack. If an attack exists, then one of the smallest attacks on this
protocol is a normal attack, de#ning normal derivations which are possible guesses for
the li’s (and de#ning as well the execution order). On the other hand if the procedure
answers YES, the veri#cation performed on the guessed derivations proves that the
protocol has an attack.
3.4.2. Multiple sessions case
We shall de#ne the execution of several sessions of a protocol P as the execution of a
single session for a more complex protocol P′ of size polynomial in |P| ×m where m is
the number of sessions. Therefore, this will reduce immediately the security problem
for several sessions to the security problem for one session and will show that the
insecurity problem is in NP for multiple sessions too. Note that the principals may
have some common initial knowledge in diLerent sessions. Hence the sessions are not
necessarily disjoint.
We assume given a protocol speci#cation P with its associated partial order ¡ on
the set of steps W . Let m be the number of sessions of this protocol we want to study,
let Var be the set of variables in P and let Nonces be the set of nonces (a subset of
Atoms) in P. The nonces are given fresh values at each new session by de#nition. Also
variables from diLerent sessions should be diLerent. This is because we consider that
in this model messages are not memorized from one session to another (except maybe
by the intruder). Therefore we shall de#ne m renaming functions 4i, for i=1; : : : ; m, as
bijections from W ∪Nonces∪Var to m new sets (mutually disjoint and disjoint from
W ∪Nonces∪Var) such that:
4i(w)=wi forall w∈W;
4i(N )=Ni for all N ∈Nonces;
4i(x)= xi for all x∈Var:
We assume that each set of steps Wi for i=1; : : : ; m, is provided with a partial order
¡i such that for all w; w′ ∈W and for all wi; w′i ∈Wi, w¡w′ iL wi¡w′i . Let Pi be
the protocol obtained by applying the renaming 4i to P. We have now m copy Pi,
i=1; : : : ; m, of the protocol. We combine them now into a unique protocol denoted
m:P as follows. The set of steps is by de#nition the union
⋃m
i=1Wi of the steps in
all copies Pi, for i=1; : : : ; m. The partial order on
⋃m
i=1Wi is de#ned as
⋃m
i=1¡i. It is
easy to see that the execution of one session of the new protocol is equivalent to the
execution of m interleaved sessions of the initial protocol.
Lemma 5. Let S0 be the initial intruder knowledge. The DAG-size of (m:P; S0) is
O(n×m) where n is the DAG-size of P; S0.
Therefore, a normal attack of m:P can be bounded polynomially:
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Corollary 3. If  is the substitution in a normal attack of m:P assuming that the
initial intruder knowledge is S0 and the DAG-size of (P; S0) is n, then  can be
represented in O((n×m)2).
Then applying the NP procedure for one session we derive immediately:
Theorem 2. Protocol insecurity for a :nite number of sessions is decidable and in
NP.
Remark 3. If we want to model n sequential sessions of the protocol instead of n
parallel sessions, we only need to use a diLerent order on the union of protocol
steps
⋃n
i=1 Wi, more precisely we take
⋃n
i=1¡i ∪{w¡w′ | ∃j; k s:t: w∈Wj;
w′ ∈Wk; j¡k}. Hence, this order forces one session to be #nished before another one
starts.
4. NP-hardness
We show now that the existence of an attack when the input are a protocol speci#-
cation and initial knowledge of the intruder is NP-hard by reduction from 3-SAT. The
proof is similar to the one given by [1] for their model, but does not need any condi-
tional branching in the protocol speci#cation. The propositional variables are x1; : : : ; xn,
and an instance of 3-SAT is f(−→x )= ∧i∈I (x6i; 1i;1 ∨ x6i; 2i;2 ∨ x6i; 3i;3 ) where 6i; j ∈{0; 1} and x0
(resp. x1) means x (resp. ¬x).
The idea of the reduction is to let the intruder generate a #rst message, 〈x1;1; : : : ; xn;3〉,
representing a possible solution for this 3-SAT problem. From this initial message a
principal A creates a term representing the instance of the formula f by this solution.
Then the intruder will use the principals B; B′; C; C′; D; D′ as oracles for verifying that
this instance can be evaluated to . In order to do it the intruder will have to select
an adequate protocol execution where each principal checks the truth of a literal in a
conjunct. For instance when the #rst literal of a conjunct is a propositional variable
(resp. a negated variable), principal B checks whether this variable was assigned the
value  (resp. ⊥). If the execution can be achieved then E gives the Secret term to
the intruder, and the protocol admits an attack.
Let us describe now the protocol. We introduce an atomic key K and two atomic
terms  and ⊥ for representing the boolean values True and False, respectively. The
encryption by K will encode negation. For instance the term {⊥}K should be interpreted
as . Then we de#ne:
• g(0; xi; j)= xi; j and g(1; xi; j)= {xi; j}K ,
• fi(−→x )= 〈g(6i;1; xi;1); 〈g(6i;2; xi;2); g(6i;3; xi;3)〉〉 for all i∈ I .
The protocol variables x; y; z occurring in the description of step (U; j) should be
considered as indexed by (U; j); the index will be omitted for readability. The partial
order on the protocol steps is the empty order. Hence the protocol steps can be executed
in any order. Note also that the number of steps for each principal B; B′; C; C′; D; D′ is
equal to the number of conjuncts in the 3-SAT instance.
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Principal A: (A; 1); 〈x1;1; : : : ; xn;3〉⇒{〈f1(−→x ); 〈f2(−→x ); 〈: : : ; 〈fn(−→x ); end〉〉〉〉}P .
Principal B: (B; i); {〈〈; 〈x; y〉〉; z〉}P⇒{z}P for i∈ I .
Principal B′: (B′; i); {〈〈{⊥}K ; 〈x; y〉〉; z〉}P⇒{z}P for i∈ I .
Principal C: (C; i); {〈〈x; 〈; y〉〉; z〉}P⇒{z}P for i∈ I .
Principal C′: (C′; i); {〈〈x; 〈{⊥}K ; y〉〉; z〉}P ⇒ {z}P for i∈ I .
Principal D: (D; i); {〈〈x; 〈y;〉〉; z〉}P⇒{z}P for i∈ I .
Principal D′: (D′; i); {〈〈x; 〈y; {⊥}K〉〉; z〉}P ⇒ {z}P for i∈ I .
Principal E: (E; 1): {end}P ⇒ Secret.
We take S0 = {;⊥} as the initial intruder knowledge. Hence there is an attack on
this protocol iL the message sent by principal A can be reduced to {end}P , i.e. for
all i∈ I , there exists j∈{1; 2; 3} such that g(6i; j ; xi; j)∈{; {⊥}K}. But this means that
the intruder has given to A a term representing a solution of 3-SAT, since g(6i; j ; xi; j)
is xi; j6i; j . Hence the protocol admits an attack iL the corresponding 3-SAT problem
has a solution. Moreover this reduction is obviously polynomial. Hence the problem
of #nding an attack with bounded sessions is NP-hard.
The example above shows that the insecurity problem is NP-hard for protocols with
pairs, but without composed keys and without variables in key positions. But we can
obtain hardness for a class of protocols with diLerent restrictions. The next protocol
shows that the insecurity problem remains NP-hard even without pairs, without com-
posed keys and with a unique honest principal whose steps are linearly ordered. On
the other hand we need to use variables at key positions.
Hence our next result will show that #nding an attack to a single session of a
sequential protocol is already an NP-hard problem. Therefore the non-determinism of
the intruder is su<cient for the insecurity problem to be NP-hard.
Let f(−→x )= ∧mi=1Dj be an instance of 3-SAT following the same de#nition as
above (for the #rst protocol), and let n be the number of propositional variables
of −→x . In the following, x and y are protocol variables and we suppose that their
occurrences represent diLerent variables in diLerent steps of the protocols, i.e. they
are implicitly indexed by the protocol steps. To each propositional variable xj
we associate an atom Vj, for j=1; : : : ; n. The initial intruder knowledge
includes:
1. {{P}⊥}K , {{P}}K , and P. The intruder will assign boolean values to −→x by using
{P}⊥ or {P}.
2. {{K}⊥}Vj and {{K}}Vj , for j=1 : : : n. These are faked values for −→x allowing the
intruder to “skip” some protocol steps when needed. But doing that, he will not
gain any useful knowledge.
We use only one honest principal A, and the protocol steps of A are linearly or-
dered by: (A; (i; j))¡(A; (i′; j′)) iL i¡i′ or i= i′ and j¡j′, for i=0; : : : ; m + 1 and
j=1; : : : ; n
(A; (0; j)): {x}K ⇒ {x}Vj .
In these steps, the intruder selects values for −→x . Since there is one and only one
step for each value Vj, the instantiation of −→x is complete and non redundant. Since
the intruder does not know K , these values can only be {P}⊥ or {P}.
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For each conjunct indice i, 16i6m, and for each j, 16j6n, such that xj is a
variable in the conjunct Di, let us de#ne the step (A; (i; j)) as:
(A; (i; j)): {{y}}Vj ⇒{Secreti}y if xj occurs positively in Di or,
(A; (i; j)): {{y}⊥}Vj ⇒{Secreti}y if xj occurs negatively in Di.
The goal of the intruder is to know all terms Secreti: this would prove that every
conjunct Di is evaluated to . To do this, he must use for y a value he knows in
order to decrypt at least one message {Secreti}y for each i. However, the intruder has
only two possible actions: either he sends to A the message {{K}}Vj or the message
{{K}⊥}Vj but then he will receive back {Secreti}K which is useless (this step can
be considered as blank for the intruder), or he has assigned to Vj the correct value
{{P}}Vj or {{P}⊥}Vj , and by sending it to A at the right step he will get back
{Secreti}P that he can decrypt with P to get Secreti.
The last protocol step is to ensure that the intruder knows each Secreti. For this
purpose let us introduce an atom BigSecret that will be revealed to the intruder iL he
knows every atom Secreti. The last protocol step is:
(A; (m+ 1; 0)): P⇒{: : : {BigSecret}Secret1 : : :}Secretm .
Therefore, the intruder knows BigSecret if and only if each conjunct Dj is evaluated
to , and this protocol has an attack on BigSecret if and only if the 3-SAT instance
admits a solution. This shows the correctness of the reduction, which is obviously
polynomial.
It is interesting to see that the class of protocols considered in the previous reduction
is very close to the simple class of ping-pong protocols [12]: the only diLerence is the
use of variables as keys (but these variables can take only atomic values).
From the results above we #nally conclude with the main result:
Theorem 3. Finding an attack for a protocol with a :xed number of sessions is an
NP-complete problem.
5. Alternative models
5.1. Extending the intruder model
In order to follow more closely concrete encryption techniques it might be useful
to introduce new algebraic rules in our model. For instance in a Vernam encryption
with secret key k, the encryption of message m will be m⊕ k (where ⊕ is the XOR
function), and the message can be decrypted by applying the same operation to the
result since (m⊕ k)⊕ k =m. Hence the following property is satis#ed: {{a}sb}sb= a.
As a consequence any message received by a principal might be (sometimes wrongly)
interpreted as a ciphertext. This can be easily exploited to derive new attacks.
For instance if we assume that the rules in Table 2 are added to the intruder model,
then new attacks can now be performed as shown in the following example (we have
omitted init and end messages). The intruder initial knowledge is {Secret}P and the
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Table 2
Extension of the intruder model
Decomposition rules Composition rules
Ls({{a}sb}sb): {{a}sb}sb→ a; {{a}sb}sb; Lr({{a}sb}sb): a→ a; {{a}sb}sb
Ls({{a}pK}pK−1 ): {{a}
p
K}pK−1 → a; {{a}
p
K}pK−1 Lr({{a}
p
K}pK−1 ): a→ a; {{a}
p
K}pK−1
protocol rules are:
((A; 1), {x}K−1 ⇒ x),
((A; 2), {{y}P}K ⇒ y).
This protocol admits the following attack when the initial knowledge of intruder is
{Charlie; {Secret}P}:
{Secret}P → {{{Secret}P}K}K−1 → {{Secret}P}K → Secret:
We can remark that such an attack cannot be performed if the Lr rules are not included
in the intruder rewrite system. Since simple cryptographic systems verify the property
that encryption is idempotent it might be interesting to add these new Lr rules. However
it is easy to prove that the insecurity problem remains NP-complete when these Lr and
Ls rules are included. These new rules behave exactly in the same way as Lc and Ld,
and we can restrict ourselves to consider again some special derivations.
Denition 7. A derivation D from E veri#es Condition 1 when for all messages a; b:
1. if Ld({{a}b}b−1 )∈D then Lr({{a}b}b−1 ) =∈D,
2. if Lc({a}b)∈D then Ls({{a}b}b−1 ) =∈D,
3. if Ls({{a}b}b−1 )∈D then Lc({{a}b}b−1 ) =∈D,
4. if Lr({{a}b}b−1 )∈D then Ld({a}b) =∈D.
Lemma 6. If t ∈ forge(E), then there exists a derivation D from E with goal t veri-
fying Condition 1.
Proof. Let D be one of the minimal derivations in length from E with goal t. Then
let us build D′ another derivation with the same initial and #nal set than D, verifying
moreover Condition 1, and minimal in length among the derivations with these initial
and #nal sets and verifying Condition 1. We reason by induction on the length of D.
If D= ∅ we take D′= ∅. Otherwise D=(E0→L1 · · · →Ln En) and by induction hypoth-
esis there exists D′1 = (E
′
0→L′1 · · · →L′n−1 E′n−1) with E0 =E′0, En−1 =E′n−1, verifying
Condition 1, and minimal in length. We show how to extend this to a derivation D′
according to the last step of D:
1. if Ln=Ld({{{-}.}}.−1 ) and there exists i¡n such that L′i =Lr({{-}.}.−1 )∈D′1,
then let L′n=Lc({-}.). L′n can be applied since -∈E′i−1 and .∈Ei−1, and we have
Ls({{-}.}.−1 ) =∈D′1 since otherwise D′1 would not be minimal in length.
2. if Ln=Lc({-}.) and there exists i¡n such that L′i =Ls({{-}.}.−1 )∈D′1, then let
L′n=Ld({{-}.}.−1 ). L′n can be applied since {{-}.}.−1 ∈E′i−1 and .∈E′i−1, and
by minimality of D′1 we have Lr({{-}.}.−1 ) =∈D′1.
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3. if Ln=Ls({{-}.}.−1 ) and there exist i¡n such that L′i =Lc({{-}.}.−1 )∈D′1,
then:
• If Lr({-}.) =∈D′1, we take L′n=Ld({-}.) since {-}. and . are in Ei−1.
• If Lr({-}.)∈D′1, then {-}. = {{-′}.−1}. and we take L′n=Lc({-′}.−1 ) since -′
and .−1 are in En−1.
4. if Ln=Lr({{-}.}.−1 ) and there exists i¡n such that L′i =Ld({-}.)∈D′1, then:
• If Ls({{{-}.}.−1}.) =∈D′1, we take L′n=Lc({{-}.}.−1 ), since {-}. and . are in
Ei−1.
• If Ls({{{-}.}.−1}.)∈D′1, we take L′n=Ld({{{-}.}.−1}.).
5. otherwise in all remaining cases we take R′=R.
Then we can notice that E′n=En for E
′
n−1→L′n E′n and D′=(E0→L0 · · · →Ln E′n) ver-
ify Condition 1. Hence, the set of derivations with the same initial and #nal sets than
D and verifying Condition 1 is not empty, and we can choose one of its elements
minimal in length.
Hence from a derivation proving that t ∈ forge(E) we can build another one verify-
ing moreover Condition 1. The minimal pre#x of this derivation that contains t is a
derivation of goal t satisfying Condition 1, and this proves the lemma.
Now, we only need to update the Derivt(E) de#nition:
Denition 8. We denote Derivt(E) a derivation of minimal length among the deriva-
tions from E with goal t and satisfying Condition 1 (chosen arbitrarily among the
possible ones).
Then the rest of the proof is almost identical to the one of Theorem 2 except that
Lc is replaced by Lc and Lr , and Ld is replaced by Ld and Ls.
Note that this model can still be improved since here the Ls and Lr rules are only
applied at the top of messages: we could also consider cases where they are applied
everywhere inside terms.
5.2. Limiting the intruder
In this section, we show how to reduce to our model other models where the intruder
is unable (for some messages) to eavesdrop, divert and modify, or impersonate.
To prevent the intruder from eavesdropping between two steps (A; i): : : :⇒M1 and
(A; j) :: M2⇒ : : : ; we introduce a new symmetric key P only known by A and B and
never published: With the steps (A; i): · · · ⇒ {〈A;M1〉}sP and (A; j): {〈A;M2〉}sP⇒ : : : ;
the intruder will never be able to intercept the message M1 and send something else
to B instead, even with the Lr rules.
To prevent the intruder from diverting and modifying the message between the
two steps above, we can use a new private key KA; i instead of P, and the steps
(A; i): : : :⇒{〈A;M1〉}pKA; i and (A; j): {〈A;M2〉}
p
KA; i ⇒ : : : . This way, if the intruder
know K−1A; i then he knows M1, but he cannot modify it, even with the Lr rules. And
since KA; i is only used for this step, the intruder can not use any other stored message.
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To prevent the intruder from impersonating a message M sent by the principal A to
B, we assume that there exists a private key K only known by the principals and never
published (it never appears in the content of a message), and we assume that K−1 is
known by everybody. Hence this amounts to replace M by {〈A;M 〉}pK in A and B’s
steps: The intruder and the principals can read M , but the intruder will never be able
to build a message in the name of A, even with the Lr rules. (But he can use old A’s
messages if we used the same key K)
The new protocol has a linear size in the initial one, even in a dag representation.
5.3. Adding choice points
We extend the protocol model in order to allow for choice points. Typically the #eld
of a message may contain information about the type of cryptography negotiated for
the rest of the session. Hence the subsequent message exchanges may depend from the
content of this #eld.
We shall consider protocol descriptions where some steps (A; i) may be composed
by priority blocks:
(A; (i; 0)): R0i ⇒ S0i ,
(A; (i; 1)): R1i ⇒ S1i ,
. . .
(A; (i; k)): Rki ⇒ Ski .
Two steps in the same priority block cannot be applied in the same execution, and
∀j; j′, (A; (i; j))¡wA(A; (i+1; j′)). This block construction is similar to a case structure
in programming languages. A protocol execution with substitution  must now also
satisfy: For every priority block (indexed by i), we apply step (A; (i; j)) if ∀j, ∀1,
Rji  =R0i 1 and . . . and Rji  =Rj−1i 1.
For technical reasons, we introduce for each variable x, a term Charliex that does
not appear anywhere in the protocol description, that is initially known only by the
intruder and such that |Charliex|=0. Then, an attack is now given by an order which
is compatible with the given partial order and a substitution  verifying the above
steps conditions, the usual Ri∈ forge(S0; : : : ; Si−1) and Secret ∈ forge(S0; : : : ; Sn)
conditions, and for all variables x, Charliex may only appear in (x). This last condition
does not restrict the intruder since he is not forced to use Charliex.
First we can remark that all properties, lemmas, and proofs about derivations remain
valid since we did not change the intruder rules. Therefore, the only proof to be adapted
is the one of Lemma 4: We build a new substitution ′ from , and we must prove
that it still satis#es the requirements for an attack. To do that, we assume #rst that
Charliex is used instead of Charlie for (x) in the proof of the lemma.
We have Ri′ ∈ forge(S0′; : : : ; Si−1′) and Secret ∈ forge(S0′; : : : ; Sn′). And for
each attack step "−1(k)= (A; (i; j)), we have Rji  =R0i 1 and . . . and Rji  =Rj−1i 1 by
de#nition of . Let us show by contradiction that there is no 1 such that Rji 
′=Rj
′
i 1
for some j′¡j. Two cases are possible: If x appears in Rji , then Charliex appears in
Rji 
′ and in Rj
′
i 1. Therefore, we have R
j
i =R
j′
i 1
′ for 1′ equal to 1 with Charliex
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replaced by (x). But this is impossible by de#nition of . If x does not appear in Rji ,
then Rji =R
j
i 
′=Rj
′
i 1 and we also have a contradiction. This way, we have proved
that ′ de#nes an attack with the same execution order and which is smaller than 
(since |Charliex|=0). The lemma follows.
Since all bounds on derivations and attacks remain valid we only need to add to our
insecurity detection procedure, an extra guessing step for the branches to be taken at
choice points in order to derive a NP procedure for the more general case of protocols
with choice.
6. Conclusion
By representing messages as dags we have been able to prove that when the number
of sessions of a protocol is #xed, an intruder needs only to forge messages of linear
size in order to #nd an attack. This result admits obvious practical implications since
it gives an a priori bound on the space of messages to be explored for #nding =aws
in the protocol (with a model-checker, for instance).
We have then derived the #rst NP-procedure for #nding an attack with a #xed
number of sessions and composed keys (also the #rst published decision procedure
for this problem). This result matches the lower bound of the problem. Some related
implementations have taken advantage of the thorough analysis in the NP membership
proof and have been able to analyze in a fairly fast way the standard examples of the
literature.
Several interesting variants of our model can be easily reduced to it. These variants
are also quite easy to implement.
For instance we could consider that a principal is unable to recognize that a message
supposed to be encrypted by some key K has really been constructed by an encryption
with K (see extension in Section 5.1). To obtain a protocol model where principals
may recognize whether a real encryption has been performed one simply extend any
cipher with a special #xed #eld.
We have considered that the intruder can eavesdrop, divert messages, and imperson-
ate other principals. However, we can model a more passive intruder, as described in
Section 5.2, by ensuring that some messages cannot be modi#ed (for instance when a
safe channel conveys them).
We have considered secrecy properties. Since correspondence attacks can also be
expressed by an execution order and a polynomial number of forge constraints they
can be detected in NP too.
Our procedure can also be adapted to protocols admitting choice points, such as SSL,
where a diLerent subprotocol can be executed by a user according to some received
message. The modi#cation of our model is described in Section 5.3. The detection of
an attack remains in NP. We can summarize the known results in the Table 3.
Finally let us notice that our model remains valid when the intruder is allowed to
generate any number of new data. We simply replace in an attack all data that is
freshly generated by the intruder by its name Charlie. This implies that in the #nite
session case, the intruder does not gain any power by creating nonces.
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Table 3
Complexity of known fragments
Without nonces With Nonces
No bounds [15] Undecidable Undecidable
In#nite number of sessions, and bounded DEXPTIME-complete Undecidable
messages [14]
Finite number of sessions, choice points, NP-complete NP-complete
and unbounded messages
Finite number of sessions, and unbounded NP-complete NP-complete
messages
Directions for future work include broadening the scope of our approach to some
cases where the number of sessions is unbounded or to commutativity of encryption
operators.
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